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The Bush-Obama Stimulus Programs 
and the Future of American 
Capitalism 
Dr. Randall Holcombe* 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper discusses the implications of the measures that the U.S. 
Federal Government has taken in response to the recent financial crisis.  It 
focuses on the Federal Reserve, the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the 
Obama stimulus package, and the bailouts of various industries by the 
Federal Government.  This paper argues that these policies undermine the 
fundamental incentives of the market economy, but what we can learn from 
these policies to avoid similar negative consequences in the future. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
What is the impact of the Bush and Obama stimulus programs on the 
future of American capitalism?  To adequately address this question, one 
must consider the nature of American capitalism, how it has produced the 
great prosperity that we have, what underlies the foundation of American 
capitalism, and how some of the policies of the past two years threaten those 
foundations. 
Think about the remarkable economic progress that we have achieved—
our standard of living, driving around in our automobiles, flying in planes, 
using cell phones, the iPod, and the Internet.  The worldwide web only 
started in the early 1990s.  This remarkable economic progress started with 
the industrial revolution in 1760, with developments beginning in Britain, 
and spreading to the rest of the world.1  One can see the sluggish 
advancement of standards of living for previous generations by examining 
their lifestyle, food, methods of production, and consumer goods.  Economic 
progress was so slow that people would not have noticed it in their lifetimes.  
Life in 1750 was not that different from life in 1650.  Likewise, life in 1650 
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was not that different from life in 1550 and life in 1550 was not that 
different from life in 550. 
There were about a thousand years of remarkable advances in 
civilization.  Ancient Rome and China had incredible advances in their 
civilization.  However, by about 550 A.D. that economic progress essentially 
slowed to a crawl and virtually stopped.  Essentially, someone who slept in 
550 and woke up in 1550 would not see that much difference in how people 
lived, how they consumed goods, and how they produced those goods. 
After the industrial revolution, remarkable economic progress began and 
is still going on today.  Profits and losses in a market economy created the 
foundation of this economic progress.  Profits give people an incentive to 
look for ways to be productive and to help other people, so entrepreneurs 
and innovators look for innovations that they can introduce into the 
economy.  Profits play several closely related roles in an economy.  Think 
about our economic well-being, if somebody takes resources and combines 
those resources into output, and the value of the output is greater than the 
value of the resources used to produce the input.  Increased value benefits all 
by increasing value in the economy. 
We should reward people who take less valuable inputs and turn them 
into output that is more valuable.  In fact, the market economy does that.  
That is the role of profit.  If somebody takes resources that have a certain 
value and they combine them into output that is worth less than the value of 
resources that they started with, they are reducing value in the economy.  We 
should penalize people who do that.  Losses penalize people who allocate 
resources inefficiently.  Conversely, profits reward people who allocate 
resources efficiently.  Those profits and losses provide incentives in an 
economy for entrepreneurial individuals who are looking for innovations if 
they can come up with innovations to increase value in an economy.  That 
profit acts as a lure to give innovators an incentive to be innovative and 
entrepreneurial. 
At the same time, that profit gives people an incentive to take risks, the 
possibility of losses also gives them an incentive to be prudent in the risks 
that they take, so that they do not take excessive risks.  Profits and losses are 
a necessary foundation for the operation of the market economy for this 
remarkable economic progress that we have had over the past 250 years.  
That is not that long in the history of mankind.  This is something relatively 
recent and is on-going that people tend to take for granted.  If we look at the 
policies that resulted in the economic downturn of the past year and a half, a 
number of cases depict economic policies that undermine the fundamental 
role of profits and losses in the economy. 
People talk about the health care reform bill, which is in the forefront of 
public discussion.  People are concerned about the huge budget deficits that 
the Obama Administration is forecasting.  This is not a partisan critique 
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because many of these policies began under the Bush Administration.  The 
Bush-Obama policies are a bipartisan effort to undermine the fundamental 
incentives of our market economy.  There are four areas related to the 
policy.  First, there is the role of the Federal Reserve.  Second, there is the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  Third, is the Obama stimulus 
package, and the fourth concern is the bailouts. 
II. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
 
The Federal Reserve was set up to be a bank for member banks.  
Members of the Federal Reserve System borrow from the Federal Reserve 
through the discount window.  The Federal Reserve was established for the 
sole purpose of making loans to member banks.  Over the years, the Federal 
Reserve’s role has evolved.  Now, one of the most important functions of the 
Federal Reserve is to control the size of the money supply through open 
market operation.  Open market operation is the buying and selling of 
Federal Government securities. 
Over the past year and a half, under Chairman Bernanke, Federal 
Reserve policy has changed substantially.  This was a bipartisan effort.  
These things began during the Bush Administration when Ben Bernanke was 
appointed chairman of the Federal Reserve by President Bush.  Of course, 
one of the major events that we saw in September 2008 was the Federal 
Reserve bailing out AIG.  It is without precedent that the Federal Reserve 
would spend $85 billion to bail out American International Group (AIG) as 
it was on the verge of collapse.  Later, the treasury used TARP money to 
take over AIG with the Federal Reserve, but the Federal Reserve has never 
bailed out private companies like this.2  It is unparalleled that a company 
taking losses and about to go bankrupt was rescued by the Federal Reserve. 
The Federal Reserve has started making loans to financial institutions 
that are not member banks or members of the Federal Reserve System.  In 
fact, they are not even banks.  The Federal Reserve began making loans to 
investment banks and other financial institutions.  This is new and 
unprecedented in Federal Reserve history. 
A third action taken by the Federal Reserve was to purchase securities 
that are not issued by the Federal Government.  It now owns and has on its 
balance sheets securities that it bought from financial firms that are not 
banks.    The Federal Reserve is not sharing information about the securities 
that it is holding.  In 2009, Bloomberg News sued the Federal Reserve under 
the Freedom of Information Act claiming that they have a right to get the 
information about what assets the Federal Reserve has purchased and what 
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assets it is holding.  As of now, the Federal Reserve has not divulged this 
information and it is under dispute as to whether that ought to be public 
information. 
Again, it is unprecedented for the Federal Reserve to be buying financial 
assets from banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System, and 
financial institutions that are not even banks.  Before the financial crisis, it 
could be fairly said that the Federal Reserve, while it controlled the money 
supply and had much to do with regulating banking, was neutral in the way 
that it operated in the economy and that most firms were treated the same 
way under objective rules.  Now, the Federal Reserve has decided it is going 
to step in, rescue some firms, and buy financial assets from other firms. 
Essentially, the Federal Reserve is engaging in an industrial policy 
similar to what the Japanese government has been doing for the past half-
century.  During the 1980s, Japanese industrial policy was heralded as a 
great way for government to manage economic growth in a high growth 
economy.  Many believed that the reason for Japan’s high growth rate was 
that the Japanese government was getting actively involved in picking 
preeminent firms in the economy, then helping and supporting those firms.  
Many in the United States believed that the U.S. should emulate Japanese 
industrial policy to raise the U.S. growth rate.3  However, since the early 
1990s, the Japanese economy has stagnated, and few still mention the virtues 
of Japanese industrial policy. 
Yet, what the Federal Reserve is doing now is moving exactly in that 
direction.  The Federal Reserve is managing industrial policy in the United 
States.  This is troubling because in helping some firms and choosing not to 
help other firms, the government is picking winners and losers in the 
economy, which is undermining the fundamental role of profits and losses in 
an economy.4  Former Treasury Secretary Paulson worked for Goldman-
Sachs, so it is probably no coincidence that Goldman-Sachs is one of the 
former investment banks still thriving.5  Other investment banks like Bear 
Stearns and Merrill Lynch were acquired, and still others like Lehman 
Brothers failed.6  This is because the Federal Reserve, with assistance from 
the Treasury, was supporting some firms, but not supporting other firms, 
which sets a very dangerous precedent. 
III. THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 
 
The second item of importance is TARP.  In late September 2008, 
Secretary Paulson concluded that the financial system was in a significant 
amount of trouble.  Inter-bank lending had nearly frozen up and financial 
markets were following suit.  The problem, according to Secretary Paulson, 
was that banks were holding on to certain toxic assets such as mortgage-
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backed securities that were difficult to value.  One might make a loan to a 
firm that ended up going under next week because of problems with its 
assets.7 
Secretary Paulson’s solution was the establishment of TARP, which was 
intended to use $700 billion to buy up those troubled assets.  The 
government would then be holding the toxic assets under TARP, and the 
banks would get money from the Treasury.  The goal was to give other 
financial institutions an assurance of their financial soundness to help 
reinvigorate the financial system and get inter-bank lending flowing again.  
Secretary Paulson claimed that this was an emergency.8  After about a week 
of debate, TARP passed through Congress in early October 2008.9  In 
retrospect, it seems that it was not necessary because the TARP money was 
not used for that purpose. 
Secretary Paulson requested $700 billion to buy those toxic assets, but 
that is not what happened to the money.  The Treasury had trouble finding 
ways to buy those toxic assets, and later decided on another plan: buying 
equity interest in banks.  Secretary Paulson’s idea was to purchase preferred 
stocks so that the Federal Government would be a significant stockholder in 
U.S. banks.  Instead of using the money to buy toxic assets like Secretary 
Paulson had proposed and Congress had approved, the money for TARP was 
used to partially nationalize the United States banking system.10 
Secretary Paulson called a summit of the CEOs of the nine largest banks 
in the United States to inform them that the government was going to buy 
equity interest in their banks, and become a partial owner of those banks.  
Many CEOs objected, but Secretary Paulson forced them to take the federal 
money and have the Federal Government partially nationalize their banks by 
claiming he did not want some banks opting out of the program while others 
were in, which would identify certain banks as weak banks.  As a result, 
every bank had to participate in the program, completing a forced 
nationalization of the American banking system.11 
After that, the strings attached to this money became apparent.  
Congress began looking at the executive compensation of these banks and 
decided that some of the executives were earning too much money 
considering that the government had just poured $700 billion into their 
banks.12  It did not matter that some of the banks originally objected to 
receiving the money.  After seeing the degree of oversight and control that 
Congress wanted to exercise over them, the banks wanted to get out of the 
program.13 
By this time, President Obama had been elected and Timothy Geithner 
had replaced Paulson as the new Secretary of the Treasury, reinforcing the 
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bipartisan nature of the plan.14  When the banks asked to buy back the stock 
held by the government, Geithner decided not to sell the stock back to them 
just yet.  He instituted stress tests that banks had to pass and introduced 
certain other measures, which essentially prevented the banks from buying 
back the preferred stock.  In other words, he enforced federal ownership of 
the banks.15 
One has to wonder what would have happened if Secretary Paulson had 
initially gone to Congress and proposed a partial nationalization of the 
banking system rather TARP. Nevertheless, that is what the money was used 
for, once again initiating a system where the profit and loss aspect that 
underlies a market economy was undermined.  The problem with a system 
like this is obvious.  When the government allows firms to keep the profits, 
but bails them out in the event that they post a loss, it upsets the profit and 
loss balance.  Firms should be entrepreneurial.  They should take prudent 
risks because that is where economic progress comes from.  However, on the 
other side, firms should be cognizant of the fact that the cost of bad 
decisions falls on them.  Thus, bailouts remove the loss side of that equation, 
which ultimately will encourage excessive risky behavior on the part of 
executives. 
IV. THE STIMULUS PACKAGE 
 
Exacerbating the situation is the Obama stimulus package, which was 
about $800 billion.  President Obama sought to pass the stimulus package 
immediately after he took office in order to prop up the failing economy and 
keep it from sliding further.16  However, very little of the stimulus bill was 
actually oriented toward economic stimulus because much of it was spent 
toward fulfilling President Obama’s campaign promises.  A sizable amount 
of that stimulus money was not spent right away, and in fact, there is still 
more that has yet to be spent out of that $800 billion. 
The irony of this is that the consensus among economists is that the 
economy is recovering, and yet that stimulus money is still coming into the 
economy.17  President Obama’s argument was that without the stimulus bill, 
unemployment would rise above 9%.18  Currently, the unemployment rate is 
about 9.7%, so by President Obama’s own metric—which may be unfair to 
the president, since perhaps he underestimated the severity of the 
recession—the economy is in worse shape now than he forecasted it would 
have been without the stimulus bill.19 
The underlying logic behind this kind of stimulus spending is basic 
Keynesian economic policy.  During his administration, one of the things 
that President Bush did twice to stimulate the economy was lowering income 
taxes.  Not only did he lower the rates to give larger refunds on tax day and 
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ensure that citizens would not be paying as much next year, but he sent out 
checks in the mail to people to stimulate the economy.20 
According to the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, budget deficits tend to 
stimulate the economy.  Keynes maintains that cutting taxes and increasing 
government spending provides a fiscal stimulus to the economy.  Thus, 
increased government spending can prop up overall spending.21  Keynes also 
proposed doing this without raising taxes because if taxes increase, that 
takes money out of the hands of the spenders in the economy.  Therefore, by 
running a budget deficit, the economy is stimulated. 
When President Bush was elected, the federal budget was in surplus, 
and for eight years during the Bush Administration, Bush cut taxes and 
increased government spending, thus increasing budget deficits.  If budget 
deficits really stimulated the economy, by the end of the Bush 
Administration the United States would have been in nirvana rather than in 
the worst recession since the Great Depression.22 
The problem is that the analysis looks at the amount of money being put 
into the economy, but does not look at where that money is coming from.  If 
the government is spending more money, that money has to come from 
somewhere.  Under this system, consumers are squeezed and investors are 
crowded out through government borrowing.  Thus, Keynesian economics 
shows the increase in government spending, but not the crowding out that 
occurs in the private sector.  This is another policy that undermines the 
workings of the market economy. 
V. THE BAILOUTS 
 
Another important issue is the bailouts, which are reflected in the 
bailouts of the banks and the financial firms.  The bailouts go further than 
that, of course, as the government has already bailed out General Motors 
(GM) and Chrysler.  Again, the bipartisan nature of the policy should be 
emphasized.  The bailouts for the auto firms started in the Bush 
Administration, and were initiated by President Bush himself.  If you go 
back to last fall, the auto companies were saying, “We are running out of 
money.  We are going to have to declare bankruptcy if we do not get an 
infusion of cash from the Federal Government.”  They were begging for a 
bailout from the Federal Government.  One place where automobile industry 
thought they could get some money was from the TARP program.  Secretary 
Paulson said, “No, TARP money is earmarked for buying toxic assets from 
financial institutions.  That money is not intended to bailout the auto 
industry.”  The issue went to Congress and Congress debated it.  Ultimately, 
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they voted to deny a bailout for the auto industry.  Last December, Secretary 
Paulson changed his mind on the TARP issue.  He gave tens of billions of 
dollars to the auto industry to bail them out from the TARP program.  TARP 
money was used to bail out General Motors and Chrysler, to keep them 
afloat and avoid bankruptcy.  It was only a few months later that the Obama 
Administration gave them more money.  In hindsight, this was not a good 
idea.  In June, GM and Chrysler declared bankruptcy anyway.  If automakers 
had gone into bankruptcy in December 2008, it would have been a private 
affair.  Instead of bankruptcy, the auto industry was propped up twice, once 
in the Bush Administration and once in the Obama Administration, but they 
eventually declared bankruptcy in June.  By that time, the Federal 
Government had a lot of money invested in those companies.  As a result, 
the government took a significant minority ownership interest in Chrysler, 
and a 61% ownership interest in GM.  This is a nationalized auto company.  
The Canadian government and the United Auto Workers also own a share of 
GM, but the stockholders were wiped out.  In addition, the bondholders 
ended up with 10% of the company converted into stock. 
The issue of whether it is a good idea to nationalize our auto 
manufactures can be debated, but it seems that the United States would have 
been better off keeping GM in the private sector.  The country would have 
been better off letting them declare bankruptcy in December with no federal 
money, rather than turning them into a nationalized auto company as we did 
when they declared bankruptcy in June.  Once again, that fundamental profit 
and loss foundation of the market economy is being undermined.  Maybe 
GM and Chrysler could have emerged from bankruptcy.  Perhaps they could 
have reorganized and come out of bankruptcy like Delta Airlines.  Delta 
Airlines reorganized during bankruptcy, and now Delta Airlines is the 
largest air carrier in the United States.  It is possible for a company to 
emerge from bankruptcy if they have a viable business model. 
If GM and Chrysler were not able to reorganize successfully, then 
valuable assets could have been purchased by other firms because if a firm 
has assets with any value, those assets do not just disappear when the firm 
declares bankruptcy.  If GM had factories and assembly lines and were 
making valuable cars, somebody else would have wanted to purchase them, 
and although GM might have been liquidated for less than GM would like, 
the assets would still be there if they were worth anything. 
Another side effect of federal intervention is that the bondholders ended 
up getting a bad deal.  The bondholders were holding secured debt.  The 
whole idea of secured debt is that in the case of bankruptcy, you get first 
claim to the assets of the bankrupt firm.  That did not happen because 
President Obama wanted to push through another package and many of the 
bondholders were willing to go along with it.  The major bondholders in GM 
at the time were JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, and 
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Goldman Sachs.23  They were okay with the Obama plan because they had 
taken federal money already, and therefore could not really complain when 
the value of their bonds eroded. 
The problem is that this undermines the value of secured debt in general 
because firms want to issue bonds.  Usually when a firm issues bonds, they 
are telling bondholders that, “In the event of a problem with this firm, if we 
declare bankruptcy, you have first claim on our assets.”  This is no longer 
the case anymore because the Federal Government took a huge share and 
left the secured bondholders with very little.  Again, there was not too much 
complaining about it because the people who owned many of the bonds were 
people who were already beholden to the Federal Government because of 
the TARP program.  This is another example of the negative effects of the 
TARP program. 
When President Obama announced his plan, he complained about some 
of the bondholders who did not like the settlement, and who thought that 
they deserved more because they were secured debt-holders.  On April 30, 
2009, President Obama was trying to push through his plan for bankruptcy 
for GM and said, “While many stakeholders made sacrifices and worked 
constructively, I have to tell you, some did not.  In particular, a group of 
investment firms and hedge funds decided to hold out for the prospect of an 
unjustified taxpayer-funded bailout.  They were hoping that everybody else 
would make sacrifices, and they would have to make none.”24  Again, most 
did not complain because they were already beholden to the Federal 
Government because of TARP.  One person who did speak out was a hedge 
fund manager named Cliff Asness.  On May 5th, he responded to President 
Obama and said, “Let’s be clear, it is the job and obligation of all investment 
managers, including hedge fund managers, to get their clients the most 
return they can.  They are allowed to be charitable with their own money, 
and many are spectacularly so, but if they give away their clients’ money to 
share in the ‘sacrifice,’ they are stealing.”25 
While President Obama is claiming that the hedge funds are asking for a 
bailout, in fact, it was only because hedge funds have not taken government 
funds that they could stand up to this bullying.  The TARP recipients had no 
choice, but to go along.  The President’s plan takes money from bondholders 
and gives it to a labor union that delivers money and votes for him. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
By bailing out bankrupt firms, we are undermining that profit and loss 
mechanism that stands at the foundation of our capitalist economy.  That 
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profit and loss mechanism has resulted in the remarkable economic progress 
that we have seen take place over the last 250 years.  The American 
economic system may be fragile.  It has only been in place for a little more 
than a couple of centuries.  It seems like a long time, but in the course of 
human events, it is not long.  Now, we are cutting the legs out from under 
the incentives that are at the foundation of American capitalism. 
Look at what has happened since the beginning of the financial crisis.  
Again, the bipartisan nature of this should be emphasized.  The TARP 
program was initiated in the Bush Administration.  Ben Bernanke, the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve was appointed by President Bush.  Many 
of the policies discussed were initiated under the Bush Administration.  
Therefore, this is not a critique only on the current Administration or on 
President Obama.  This is something that goes back to the Bush 
Administration and has been a bipartisan effort. 
In response to the financial crisis, we are nationalizing our banking and 
financial industry, we are nationalizing the automobile industry, and the 
Federal Government owns 80% of AIG and 61% of GM.  Currently, an 
important policy issue is the healthcare debate.  We are thinking about 
having the Federal Government play a much larger role in the healthcare 
system that it already dominates.  In energy policy, we are talking about the 
Federal Government playing a much larger role in our energy markets.  We 
are really looking at a fundamental transformation here in the nature of 
American capitalism. 
Many who have been around long enough, have had a pessimistic 
feeling about our economic future before.  The 1970s was a decade of 
double-digit inflation and rising unemployment.  There was an energy crisis 
with lines at the gas pump caused by Federal Government price controls on 
gasoline.  The Iranians were occupying the U.S. embassy.  The 1970s was 
also the decade that brought in disco music and polyester leisure suits.  
There is not much good to be said about the 1970s.  Despite that, Americans 
managed to turn things around in the 1980s and the 1990s.  By 1989, with 
the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and in 1991 with the demise of the Soviet 
Union, it would appear that the virtues of the market economy over 
government planning would have looked so large that there would be no 
turning back.  Over the twentieth century, in the struggle between socialism 
and capitalism, the strength of the capitalist economy won.  With the 
collapse of those centrally planned economies, everybody said, “We now 
see, capitalism is the right way to go.  Market allocation of resources is 
better than government planning.”  It is interesting that so much of the 
current debate turns on how much more involved we want the government to 
be in our economy. 
To conclude, there is a message of hope and change.  Hopefully, the 
gloomy outlook of the Obama policy does not come to fruition.  The hope is 
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that with a little distance, we will be able to look back and see that we had a 
little too much intervention and that the market economy really works quite 
well.  Hopefully, there may be some lessons that we can learn from this that 
will strengthen the market economy. 
 
 1. “Industrial Revolution” (Encyclopedia Britannica Online), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/287086/Industrial-Revolution (accessed October 20, 
2010). 
 2.  “Where is the Money: Eye on the Bailout,” ProPublica, available from 
http://bailout.propublica.org/entities/8-aig (accessed October 20, 2010). 
 3. Karen W. Arenson, “Debate Grows Over Adoption of National Industrial Policy,” New 
York Times, June 19, 1983, available from http://www.nytimes.com/1983/06/19/business/debate-
grows-over-adoption-of-national-industrial-
policy.html?scp=2&sq=japanese+industrial+policy&st=nyt (accessed October 20, 2010). 
 4. Ben S. Bernanke, “Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis” (presented at the 
Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce, Austin, TX, 1 December 2008), available from 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081201a.htm (accessed April 20, 
2010). 
 5. Gretchen Morgenson and Don Van Natta, Jr., “During Crisis, Paulson’s Calls to Goldman 
Tested Ethics,” New York Times, August 8, 2009, available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/business/09paulson.html?scp=13&sq=henry+paulson&st=nyt 
(accessed October 20, 2010). 
 6. Ben S. Bernanke, “Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis.” 
 7. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., “Testimony by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. Before the Senate 
Banking Committee on Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government 
Sponsored Entities, Investment Banks, and Other Financial Institutions” (presented to the Senate 
Banking Committee, Washington, D.C., 23 September 2008), available from 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1153.htm (accessed October 20, 2010). 
 8. Zachary Kouwe, “Paulson Counters His Critics,” New York Times, July 17, 2009, available 
from 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A00E0DD113CF934A25754C0A96F9C8B63&scp
=17&sq=henry+paulson&st=nyt (accessed October 20, 2010). 
 9. David M. Herszenhorn, “Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules,” 
New York Times, October 3, 2008, available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/04/business/economy/04bailout.html (accessed April 20, 2010). 
 10. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., “Remarks by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Financial Rescue 
Package and Economic Update” (12 November 1968), available from 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1265.htm (accessed October 20, 2010). 
 11. Joe Weisenthal “Documents Reveal How Paulson Forced Banks to Take TARP Cash,” 
Business Insider, available from http://www.businessinsider.com/uncovered-tarp-docs-reveal-how-
paulson-forced-banks-to-take-the-cash-2009-5 (accessed October 20, 2010). 
 12. Edmund L. Andrews and Vikas Bajaj, “Amid Fury, U.S. Is Set to Curb Executives’ Pay 
After Bailouts,” New York Times, February 4, 2009, available from 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE3D61238F937A35751C0A96F9C8B63&scp
=41&sq=troubled+asset+relief+program+proposal&st=nyt (accessed October 20, 2010). 
 13. Jackie Calmes, “U.S. Forecasts Smaller Loss from Bailout of Banks,” New York Times, 
December 6, 2009, available from 
 66 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/07/business/07tarp.html?scp=16&sq=geithner+stress+tests&st=ny
t (accessed October 20, 2010). 
 14. Mark Landler and Jackie Calmes, “Geithner, Rescue-Team Veteran, Has Head Start in 
Seizing Reins,” New York Times, November 24, 2008, available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/us/politics/25geithner.html (accessed October 20, 2010). 
 15. Jackie Calmes and Michael Cooper, “New Consensus Sees Stimulus Package as Worthy 
Step,” New York Times, November 20, 2009, available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/21/business/economy/21stimulus.html (accessed October 20, 
2010). 
 16. Ibid. 
 17. Ibid. 
 18. Ibid. 
 19. United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics 
from the Current Population Survey, available from 
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS140
00000 (accessed October 20, 2010). 
 20. “The President’s Agenda for Tax Relief,” George W. Bush White House Archives, 
available from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/reports/taxplan.html (accessed 
October 20, 2010). 
 21. Milton Friedman, “The Economy: We Are All Keynesians Now,” Time, December 31, 
1965, available from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,842353-1,00.html 
(accessed October 20, 2010). 
 22. Lee Price, “The Boom that Wasn’t: The Economy Has Little to Show for $860 Billion in 
Tax Cuts,” (Economic Policy Institute, October 25, 2005), available from 
http://epi.3cdn.net/767992214da6a41eb9_3um6bn297.pdf (accessed October 20, 2010). 
 23. Joseph R. Szczesny, “Chrysler and General Motors Make New Bids to Survive,” Time, 
April 27, 2009, available from http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1894208,00.html 
(accessed October 20, 2010). 
 24. Barak Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Auto Industry” (April 30, 2009), 
available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-the-Auto-
Industry/ (accessed October 20, 2010). 
 25. Andrew Ross Sorkin, “Hedge Fund Manager Strikes Back at Obama,” New York Times, 
May 5, 2009, available from http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/a-hedge-fund-manager-
strikes-back-at-obama/ (accessed October 20, 2010). 
